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.1.ABSTRACT
We provide  exact  solutions  for  a  class  of  stochastic  dynamic
programming  problems  in  growth  theory  involving  pairs  of  constant  relative
risk  aversion  utili~  functions  and  multi-sector  CES technologies. This
generalizes  the  solutions  for  the  well-known  case  of  logarithmic  utility
coupled  with  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions. We  are  also  able  to
incorparate  depreciation  schemes  through  a  vintage  capital  approach We
then  study  applications  of  our  re8ults  to  dynamic  games JEL  Classflcatlon
Numbers:  020.  026.  111.  Key words:  Dynamic programming.  dynamic  games,
growth  theory
-2-1.  Introduction
Many  problems  in  economic  theory  can  be  formulated  in  terms  of
Since  general  analytic  solutions  are  not  available, dynamic  programming.
one  often  uses  particular  functional  forms  amenable  to  analytical
In  finance,  intertemporal  problems  of  portfolio  choice  involve solution.
linear  budget  conatraints  and  some reasonable  functional  forms  for
preferences  can  be  chosen  to  obtain  explicit  8olutions. In  growth  theory
however.  the  production  functions  forming  the  constraint  set  are  typically
nonlinear About  the  only  type  of  problem  that  can  be  explicitly  solved
in  the  growth  context  is  the  one  with  logarithmic  preferences  and  Cobb-
Douglas  technology.  and  such  a  specification  of  technology  is  not
(This  i8 compatible  with  less  than  a  hundred  percent  depreciation  rat.
so  because  less  than  full  depreciation  adds  a  linear  component  to  the
production  function.) A  successful  application  of  this  framework  to  a
stochastic  multi.ector  growth  model  is  given  by  Long  and  Plosser 1983)
In  this  paper  we  propose  to  extend  the  class  of  solvable
specifications  in  growth  problems  to  pairs  of  constant  relative  risk
The aversion  utility  functions  coupled  with  CES  production  functions.
results  generalize  the  log  utility  and  Cobb-Douglas  production
specification  in  several  ways. Fir.t.  in  the  single  capital  good  case
where  the  production  function  is  subject  to  a  stochastic  shock  following  a
Markov  process,  the  propensities  to  save  are  not  constants  but  random
variables  that  depend  on  realizations  of  the  shock Nevertheless  the
propensities  are  still  independent  of  the  stock  of  capital Second,  in
the  multisector  case  where  elasticities  of  substitution  differ  across
-3-goods.  the  propensities  to  save.  the  equilibrium  quantity  of  labor  and  the
proportions  of  factors  allocated  across  goods  also  depend  on  the  capital
Finally,  we  can  allow  for  a  variety  of  vintages  of  capital stock  vector
that  differentiates  equipment  by  age.  and  in  this  manner  we  can  introduce
depreciation  schemes  along  the  lines  suggested  by  Radner  [1966] Explicit
solutions  can  be  obtained  without  recourse  to  quadratic  approximations  and
the  model  can  then  be  simulated  on  the  computer
In  section  three  we  apply  the  solution  techniques  of  the  earlier
sections  to  dynamic  games  of  the  type  investigated  by  Levhari  and  Kirman
[1980]. We  are  interested  in  trigger  strategy  equilibria  where
punishments  for  deviating  from  cooperation  consist  of  reversion  to
stationary  equilibria. A particular  type  of  powerful  punishment  consists
of  extreme  stationary  equilibria  where  agents  consume  all  that  they  can,
thereby  exhausting  the  stock In  the  log  utility  Cobb-Douglas
specification  such  extreme  actions  lead  to  equilibrium  states  of  zero
consumption  and  infinitely  negative  utility In  our  framework
elasticities  of  substitution  smaller  than  unity  generate  much  less  drastic
(and  maybe  more  plausible)  trigger  strategies. The  enforcability  of
cooperative  behavior  from  some  initial  states  but  not  from  others  becomes
an  issue  of  particular  interest,  which  we  can  study  in  some  detail We
also  iuvestigate  and  discuss  the  possibility  of  .switching  equilibria.
studied  in  Benhabib  and  Radner  [1988].  where  cooperative  behavior  is
eventually  but  not  immediately  enforced  along  an  equilibrium  path. The
parameterization  of  our  model  by  the  substitution  elasticities  turns  out
to  be  quite  useful  for  a heuristic  understanding  of  the  nature  of  trigger
strategy  equilibria.  as  discussed  at  the  end  of  section  three
-4-The  last  section  offers  tentative  conjectures  about  policy  functions
corresponding  to  more  general  specifications  than  the  ones  that  we  have
considered
An analxtical  8o1ution  for  the  simnle  stochastic  case  when  canital
lasts  two  Reri.ods.
For  ease  of  exposition  we  will  start  with  a  simple  stochastic  growth
model The  representative  agent  has  a  separable  utili~  function  given  by
U(c,L)  -  AC1-c  +  W(l-L)  - u(c)  +  W(l-L: where  A -  A'/(l-c).  A'.  c  >  0  and
V  i8  a  concave  function  representing  the  utility  of  leisure Total  time
endowment  is  normalized  to  one,  L  is  labor  and  c  is  consumption
The production  function  is  of  CES type We will  treat  depreciation
along  the  lines  suggested  by  Redner 1966].  who  adopted  a  vintage
New  equipment  k  turns  into  depreciated  one-period  old structure.
equipment  Plk  after  one  period,  into  two-period  old  equipment  P2Plk  after
two  periods  and  so  on (1-  ~1)  is  the  depreciation  rate  for  equipment
that: i.  1-1 years  old Thus  any  arbitrary  depreciation  scheme is
pos81ble. The  treatment  of  production  however  differentiates  this  scheme
The  production  function  is  of from  the  standard  aggregative  treatments
the  CIS  type.  given  by
y - Z(al~-. +  a2~-C
where  ~' al'  &z>  0,  ~  is  new  equipment  and  ~  is  one-year  old  equipment
The  multiplicative  facto~  z  can  be  taken  as  the  observed  shock  which
-5-follows  some  arbitrary  stochastic  process.  For  simplicity  we  will  assume
that  z  follows  a  stationary  first  order  Markov  process  so  that  Zt+l  =
ftet,  where  et  is  lognormally  distributed  for  all  t  and  0  ~  A  <  1.
For  simplicity  we  also  assume  that  capital  lasts  two  periods  only,
that  it  depreciates  at  rate  (l-~l)  at  the  end  of  the  first  period,  and
that  new  and  old  machines  enter  production  as  separate  capital  goods,
rather  than  as  a  simple  weighted  aggregate.  This  specification  implies
that  new  and  old  machines  are  complements  rather  than  substitutes.  (For  a
more  traditional  specification  where  capital  goods  of  different  vintages
are  substitutes,  see  Benhabib  and  Rustichini  [1989].)  In  this  framework,
al  and  az  can  be  chosen  to  reflect  the  relative  importance  of  each  vintage
in  the  process  of  production.  This  formulation  follows  Radner  [1966],
except  that  the  production  function  is  Cobb-Douglas  and  the  utility
function  is  logarithmic  in  the  Radner  formulation.  Since  factors  enter
multiplicatively  in  the  Radner  formulation,  positive  production  requires
all  vintages  to  be  present  in  positive  amounts.
Analytic  solutions  for  dynamic  programming  growth  problems  are  known
for  some  special  cases.  The  basic  cases  are  the  constant  relative  risk
aversion  utility  functions  for  consumption  (or  more  generally,  those  of
the  HARA  type)  coupled  with  linear  technologies,  generally  used  for
portfolio  problems;  the  simple  linear  utility  functions  coupled  with
arbitrary  production  functions;  and  the  well-known  log  utility  coupled
with  Cobb-Douglas  production.  If  we  let  £u  and  £p  be  the  elasticities  of
substitution  for  the  constant-relative  risk  aversion  utility  functions  and
the  CES  production  functions  respectively,  the  diagram  below  represents
-6-
~  (what  ,is  already  known  and  what  we  propose  to  add The  vertical  axis
(linear  technology),  the  horizontal  axis  (linear  utility),  and  the  point
(1,1)  represents  cases  that  we  already  know  how  to  solve. The  diagonal
represents  the  new  cases  for  which  we  propose  a  solution
Figure  1
(The  multisector  case  requires  a  generalization  and  will  be  presented
later.) Therefore  we  set  the  ela8ticity  of  substitution  for  utili~
given  by  f,  equal  to  the  elasticity  of  substitution  for  production,  given
by  E' The  dynamic  programming  problem  then  becomes,  given  the  current
equipment  level  kl'  the  one-year  old  equipment  level~,  and  the
realization  of  the  shock  zl'
-  c,pk1,  ZZ}
subject  to  0 :s c  :s ZI(alk~-C  + az~-c  +  (l-al-az)Ll-C)  and 0 :s L :s 1. The
expectation  involving  the  random  variable  z2  is  taken  with  respect  to  the
1 realization  of  Zt.
1  Sufficient  conditions  for  the  value  function  to  be well-defined  would
-7We  briefly  outline  the  computations  used  to  derive  the  policy
function.  Throughout  the  paper,  we  will  restrict  our  attention  to
characterizing  interior  solutions.  Straightforward  modifications  needed
for  characterizing  solutions  on  the  boundary  are  left  to  the  reader.  The
first  order  conditions  with  respect  to  consumption  and  labor  are  given  by
A(l-f)c-f  =  5EV{
dW -  = 5EV .MPL
dL  1  1
where  MPLj  is  the  marginal  product  of  labor  in  the  jth  good:  in  the  one
sector  model  used  above  of  course  j=l.  Similarly  MPKij  will  denote  the
marginal  product  of  the  equipment  of  vintage  i  in  the  production  of  good
j.  The  notation'  and"  denote  the  number  of  periods  ahead  at  which  the
,
variable  is  evaluated.  Hence  V1  is  evaluated  at  the  values  that
variables  take  on  next  period,  V;  at  values  two  periods  from  now  and  so
on.  Differentiating  V  we  obtain:
,  -f V2 =  5EV1.MPK21  =  A(l-f)c  .MPK21
,  ,  -f  ,  -f  , Vl  =  5EVl  'MPKll  +  jJ.5EV2  =  A(l-f)c  .MPKll  +  jJ.5EA(1-f)  (c)  .MPK21'
require  some  assumptions  to  assure  boundedness.  It  can  be  shown  (see
Benhabib  and  Rustichini  [1989])  that  the  total  value  will  be  bounded  if
(al)1/8,  5  <  1  and  () <  1  where  ()  is  the  autoregressive  component  of  a
first-order  stochastic  process  for  z:  that  is  Zt+l  =  z:.
-8-
(Updating  and  substituting  into  the  first  order  condition  for  consumption
we  get  the  equation:
- 6A(1-f)Br(c')-(.MPK~1 A(l-e)c
equation  has  the  standard  interpretation  that  the  marginal  utility  of
a  consumption  unit  today  equals  the  discounted  sum  of  utilities  that  it
We note  that  for  the  CBS case  MPK11 will  produce  in  the  future.
I-, a1(y!k1)C.  Let  the  candidate  8olution  for  the  policy  function  be  given z
,  ., Then  k1  -  (l-~)y  and  k2 -  pk1 -  p(l-~)y. Substituting by c -  ~y.
these  into  equation  (*)  and  solving  for  ~  at  time  zero  we  obtain:
For  the  case  of  log  utility  and  Cobb-Douglas  production  where  £-1  and  no
vintages  (a2-o),  this  reduces  to  the  standard  result  that  the  marginal
We a180  obtain propensity  to  consume  is  equal  to  (1-&16).  a  constant.
that  the  labor  supply  at  time  zero  is  the  solution  to:
dV
dL
1-c  -c  -c -  A(l-f.)(l-al-~)zO  ~  L
Choosing  a  function  W(l-L)  yields  the  quantity  of  labor  supply.
The  solution  to  the  dynamic  programming  problem  is  therefore  given  by
the  expressions  for  the  marginal  propensity  to  save  and  the  labor  supply
each  period  which  are  random  variables  independent  of  the  capital  stocks
-9-I
I
~  We will  see  below  that  this  will  no  longer  be  the  case  when there  is  more
t  than  one  produced  capital  good.  (Note  of  course  that  if  z's  are  iid,  then
,




r  presented  above.)
I
..  The  dynamics  of  growth  can  also  be  represented  by  a  simple  linear
difference  equation.  We  have  kt+l  -  (l-).)Yt.  Let  Xt  =  k~-E  for  all  t.
Then  the  dynamics  are  given  by
( ) l-f  l-f Xt+l  -  zt(l-).)  (alxt  +  J1.  aZxt+l  +  (l-al-az)L)
where  L  is  the  constant  optimal  labor  supply.
We  should  also  note  that  it  is  possible  to  slightly  extend  the  above
case  to  a  HARA  utility  function.  Consider  for  simplicity  the  case  without
the  vintage  (az=O).  Then  let  u(c)  =  A(C+~)l-f  where  ~  is  a  constant  and
let  the  corresponding  CES  production  function  be  given  by
Yt  =  Zt  (al  (k+-y)  l-f  +  (l-al)L  l-f)  l/(l-f)
where  -y  =  -~.  Then  it  is  easily  shown that  the  optimal  policy  is  c  =  ).y  +
d  where  ).  =  l-(oal)l/f  and  that  d  =  -~  =  'Y.  Thus  a  solution  for  this  case
requires  utility  and  production  function  pairs  for  which  not  only  the
substitution  e1asticites  are  identical  but  for  which  the  constants  ~  and  'Y
add  up  to  zero.  In  such  a  case  either  the  production  function  or  the




")-(  ,  -(  ,  2  "  -(  " A1(1-E1)C11  =  OA1(1-E1)(C1)  1.MPK11  +  0  11.1A1(1-E1) (C1)  1.MPK31
3  ,"  -(1  ,"
+  0  11.311.1A1(1-  E1) (C1)  .MPK51
-(  ,-(,  2  "-(" A2(1-E2)c22  =  oA2(1-E2)(c2)  2.MPK22  +  0  11.2A2(1-E2)  (C2)  2.MPK42
3  ,"  -(2  ,"
+  0  11.411.2A2(1-E2)  (C2)  .MPK62
The  interpretation  of  the  above  conditions  is  standard,  and  as  before:  the
marginal  utility  of  consumption  in  the  current  period  equals  the
discounted  sum  of  utilities  that  a  unit  of  a  capital  good  can  produce
during  its  life.  Note  that  MPKij  denotes  the  marginal  product  of  capital
good  i  in  the  production  of  good  j.
If  we  set  c1  =  A1y1  and  c2  =  A2y2,  we  can  simplify  the  first  order
conditions  for  the  whole  system  to  the  following  equations:
(1 ) (1 f -(1  ,,2  l-(l f -(1  ,,3 ( ) l-(l f -(1 -A1  =  0°11  11  +  Q  °3111.1  31  +  Q  °51  11.111.3  51
1 ) ( f -(2  ,,2  1-(2 (1 f ) -(2  ,,3 ( ) 1-(2 (1 f ) -(2  (  -A2  2  =  0°22  21  +  Q  °4211.2  - 41  +  Q  °61  11.411.2  -  61
A1(1-E1)A2(2 { Oi2fi~1 } (  -  (2  =  ki1  fori=0,1,...,6
A2(1-E2)A1(1  °i1(1-fi1)(2
A(l-  E1)  °01
W'(gt-L)  =  .  -  L-(l
A(l  f  (1
1  01
where  ko  =  L.  The  above  10  equations  can  then  be  solved  for  the  10




We first  note  that  unless  f1  =  f2'  the  solution  will  depend  on  the
state  vector  (k1,  k2,  ..,  k6).  Thus  A1'  A2'  fi1  and  L  are  in  general  not
independent  of  the  state  variable.  Second,  an  explicit  solution  is  not
generally  possible  so  that  a  non-linear  solver  will  be  required  to  solve
the  above  equations  at  every  step  along  the  optimal  path.  The  solution
will  nevertheless  be  exact  and  will  not  involve  approximations.  Given  the
parameters  of  the  system,  the  optimal  paths  for  the  capital  goods  and  the
evolution  of  A1'  A2'  fi1  and  L  can  be  computed.
We can  easily  modify  the  above  derivations  along  the  lines  of  the
previous  section  to  introduce  stochastic  shocks  and  allow  the  shocks  to
differ  across  goods.  For  example,  for  the  case  where  the  two  capital
goods  last  only  one  period  (~1=~2=~3=~4=O)  and  z~  is  the  multiplicative
shock  to  the  ith  good  in  period  j,  the  optimal  policies  are  given  by  the
six  equations:
(1-A1)  =  {{"'16E(zi)1-f1Iz~)}1/f'r'1
(1-A2)  =  {{"216E(Z~)1-f2Iz~)}1/f2r1-f21)
(1 ) -f1 { ( 2 )1-f2 )f f1 } A1  - f 1  A1  °12  Zo  11  f  -  f
Q-  -  .  k1  2 =  A2(1-f2)A;f2  -  °11  (z~)1-f1  )(1-f11)f2  1
{ 022(z~)1-f2)(1-f21)f2 } f-f  Q =  .  k22  1




I{ a02  (z~)1-£2)(1-f01)£2 } £-£  Q-  .  L2  1
a01  (Z~)l-£l)  (f01)£1
{ A1  (1-  f  1  )  aO  1  (Z~  )  1  -  £  1
} W'  (gt  -L)  =
A £ 1 (f  L) £ 1
1  01
Note  again  that  policies  will  be  independent  of  stock  levels  if
f1=f2'  The  above  framework  also  allows  a  portfolio  analysis  of  the
effects  of  differential  changes  in  the  riskiness  and  in  the  mean  returns
of  the  two  assets,  which  we  do  not  pursue  further  in  this  paper.
4.  Applications  to  Dynamic  Garnes.
In  this  section  we  apply  the  results  of  the  previous  section  to
theory  of  dynamic  games.  The  basic  model  is  that  of  Levhari  and  Mirman
[1980],  extended  to  allow  for  history-dependent  trigger  strategies.  The
model  has  two  players,  whose  total  utilities  are  given  by
Q)  it.
~  U(c){3  ,  1. =  1,  2.
0
The  accumulation  equation  for  capital  is
kt+1  -  f(kt)  -  c~  -  c~  '  ko  given.
Of  course,  the  constraints  c1,  C2,  k  ~  0  must  hold  at  all  times.  We
define  Yt  =  f(kt).
The  strategy  of  player  i  will  be  represented  by  a  function  which  maps
the  state  (Yt'  Yt+1)  into  consumption  c~  :  c~  =  hi(Yt,  Yt+1)'  This
-15-
-  (',1 If  we  let  c where  primes  denote  variables  evaluated  one  period  ahead.
~y  and  then  note  that  k~  -  (l-2~)y,  we  obtain  as  a  solution:
1.  -
Since  in  equilibrium,  as  can  be  ascertained  fro.  fir8t  order  conditions,
Cl-c2  at  each  moment  in  time,  the  value  V(k)  will  also  correspond  to  the
total  utility  that  a  single  player  obtains  under  cooperation If  we  set
V(k)  -  skI-'  +  I,  we  obtain  (since  Cl-c2)
V(k)  -  sk1-. +  1  -  (l/(l-c»~l-'(Qlkl-'+aoll-')
Equating  coefficients  and  solving,  we  obtain
(l/(l-c»~l-Cal
1-(Po1)1/f °1(1/2)1-'(1/(1-_) s - -
1-- 1 - P(1-2A.) °1
I -
Of  course  the  consumption  strategies  required  by  cooperation  are  not
equilibrium  strategies  unless  they  can  be  sustained  by  some  threats
We now  compute  an  equilibrium  in  stationary  strategies. Each
players'  value  function  is  defined  as
.17-- c)} +  pv(l-~~)(Ql~-'+GoJ.l-')l'(l-.) V.(k)  -
where  ~~  i8  the  proportion  of  output  appropriated  by  the  opposing  player
who  is  following  a  stationary  strategy. If  we set  the  stationary  strategy
of  the  player  as  c  -  ~.Y.  we  can  compute  the  stationary  equilibrium
8olution  with  the  same  technique  used  for  the  cooperative  case We obtain
the  two  equations
(1-.\.-.\~)' - .8al(l-A:>
(l.~~.~.)' - .8o1(1-~.)
which  imply that  ~~ -  ~. where  ~.  i8  the  8olution  to
(l.n.)' - .801  (l-A.).
The  value  function  for  a  player  in  a  stationary  equilibrium  will  be
given  by
1-f V. (k)  -  8.k  + I.
where
s,
18-( ) l-f  Is  =  1/(1-,8)  (aa/al).R.  ss.
Since  cooperation  dominates  the  stationary  equilibrium  for  all  k,  it
follows  that  s  ~  ss'  I  ~  Is.
The  above  analysis  for  stationary  equilibria  can  also  be  generalized
to  the  case  of  multiple  capital  goods,  using  the  same  techniques  as  in  the
previous  section.  The  consumption  propensity  for  good  i  would  be  given  by
A;  which  solves  (1-2A;)  =  ,8aii(l-A;),  where  ail  is  the  coefficient  of
the  capital  good  i  in  the  CES  production  function  of  the  i'th  good.  This
still  leaves  the  question  of  the  allocation  of  each  capital  stock  to  the
production  of  the  various  goods.  If  one  player  was  assigned  the  task,  his
dominant  strategy  would  be  to  choose  the  allocations  efficiently,  as  in
the  previous  section.  The  derivation  of  the  allocation  proportions  fij
would  also  essentially  follow  the  rules  of  the  previous  section.
We  now  turn  to  trigger  strategies.  Let  the  strategy  of  each  player
be  defined  by
i { AYt  if  kt  =  (1-2A)Yt-l
c  = t
AsYt  otherwise
Thus  player  i  follows  the  cooperative  strategy  if  both  himself  or  the
opposing  player  has  followed  the  cooperative  strategy  in  the  previous
period.  Otherwise  he  reverts  to  the  stationary  strategy.  The  value  of
optimally  defecting  from  cooperation  is  therefore  given  by
-19-
~  (of  course  that  the  trigger  atrategies  defined  above  imply  that
if  a  defection  takes  place  once,  the  players  will  revert  to  stationary
strategies  forever The  optimal  defection  value  for  consumption  is  given
by
c  -  (1-~)~8DY
where  ~SD -
-llc
The  value  of  defection,  VsD(k)  is  given  by
1-. -  sSDk  +  lID
where
SSD
The  issue  that  arises  in  this  case  is  whether  V  and  VSD  intersect:
that  i8.  can  cooperation  be  enforced  with  trigger  strategies  from  some
states  but  not  for  others? In  particular  we  can  inquire  if  cooperation  is
fea.ible  for  k  ~  k  (k  s  k)  but  not  for  k  <  k  (k  >  k)  where  k>  0  is  some
critical  value. These  possibilities  can  be  ruled  out  by  simple  inspection
-20-If  8  >  88D'  then  it  follow8  that  I  >  lSD'  and of  S,  .10'  I  and  Isoo
conversely,  if.  <  880'  it  follows  that  I  <  Iso.  so  that  V  and  VSD do  not
We  can  express  this  with  the  following  Lemma: intersect.
If  cooperation  i8  enforcable  (unenforcable)  under  the  threat  of Lemma 1:
reverting  to  the  8tationary  equilibrium  from  some  k,  it  is  enforcable
(unenforcab1e)  from  all  k.
Another  type  of  trigger  strategy  involves  much stronger  punishments.
where a  player  tries  to  consume all  the  output  that  he  can. The  best
response  for  the  opposing  player  i8  to  also  consume  as  much  as  he  can. We
will  assume  that  if  players  try  to  consume  more  than  the  available  output
they  will  share  what  is  available  equally,  unless  one  player  tries  to
consume less  than  half  of  what  i8  available In  such  a  case  that  player
gets  the  full  amount  he  is  aiming  for,  and  the  opposing  player  gets  the
Of  course  in  equilibrium  neither  player  will  be  satisified  to remainder.
see  the  other  player  get  more  than  half  of  the  output  and  thereby  exhaust
Strategies  for  which  agents  try  to  consume  all  the what  is  available.
available  stock  will  be  termed  extreme More foraally.  .  trigger  strategy
involving  extreme  punishments  can  be  expressed  as
if ~  -  (l-tl)Yt.-l
~yt.
c.. -
(l-~'  )Yt. otherwise
Of where  ~'  is  the  proportion  of  output  consumed  by  the  other  player.
-21-course  the  sharing  rule  states  that  if  ~'~  1/2,  then  the  realized
-  (1/a  )Yt conswaption  ct.
The  value  of  defecting  from  cooperation  under  the  threat  of  an
extreme  punishment  is  given  by
The  last  term  on  the  right-hand  side  represents  the  total  payoff  to
the  players  after  the  stock  of  capital  has  been  exhausted  at  the  end  of
the  second  period Note  that  this  is  only  feasible  if  E  <  1  since
otherwise  no  output  can  be  produced  without  capital,  &8  in  the  Cobb
Douglas  case. Furthermore,  if  f  ~  1  the  utility  of  zero  consumption  will
be  minus  infinity so  that  defection  will  never  become  attractive
The  optimal  consumption  to  initiate  defection  in  this  case  is  given
by
c  -  ~(1-1)y
1
where  ~D -
1  +  (PO1)l'_(1/2)(1-_),-
Of  course  in  equilibrium  it  is  a  dominant  strategy  for  both  players  not  to
withold  any  of  their  labor  endowments  because  there  is  no  disutility  of
labor.
The  value  function  for  each  player  in  this  case  is  given  by
-22-VD(k) 1-, 1 -  sok  +  D
where
1-.
While  we  have  not  formally  proved  the  analogue  of  Lemma 1  for  this
case.  simulations  on  the  computer  suggest  that  an  analogous  result  holds
for  this  case  as  well 1988]  have  shown  that  if Benhabib  and  Radner
agents  have  a  HARA  utility  function  (of  the  type  (c+q)G where"  is  a
po8itive  constant)  and  face  a  simple  linear  technology  without  labor
inputs,  then  it  is  possible  to  construct  examples  where  cooperation  cannot
be  enforced  from  low  stocks  but  can  be  enforced  by  high  stocks  (see  also
Benhabib  and  Ferri 1987) Furthermore.  in  their  example.  a  symmetric
non-cooperative  consumption  strategy  that  starts  in  the  region  where
cooperation  is  unenforcable  and  grows  into  the  cooperative  region  after
which  players  switch  to  cooperative  strategies is  enforcable  as  an
equilibrium  under  the  threat  of  reverting  to  the  extreme  equilibrium
Benhabib  and  Radner 1988]  termed  the  strategies  followed  along  such  an
equilibrium  path  switching  strategies Of  course  since  they  constitute  an
equilibriua,  the  payoffs  associated  with  switching  strategies  must
dominate  the  value  of  defecting  from  them
We  can  offer  a  conjecture  as  to  why  equilibria  with  switching
strategies  are  possible  in  the  HARA  case  with  a  linear  technology  and  not
-23in  the  case  of  a  constant  relative  risk  aversion  utility  coupled  with  CES
production. Both  formulations  require  sufficient  curvature  of  the  utility
of  consumption  to  dampen  the  value  of  defection  with  a  large  amount  of
consumption  when  the  stock  is  large. Similarly,  both  formulations  require
some  positive  utility  when  the  stock  levels  have  been  depleted  80  that  the
value  of  defection  is  high  enough  for  low  stocks This  is  acheived  by  the
~  term  in  the  HARA case  so  that  players  can  continue  to  accumulate  utility
after  stocks  are  depleted  and  consumption  1s  zero. In  the  CES  case
positive  consumption  can  continue  after  stocks  are  depleted  because  labor
However  in  the  latter  case  the  curvature  of alone  produces  output
utility  is  tied  to  the  curvature  of  production A  strongly  curved  utility
also  implies  a  low  elasticity  of  substitution  in  production  so  that  labor
Thus  it  may  be  possible is  not  effective  in  producing  output  on  its  own
to  dampen the  value  of  a  defection  from  high  stocks  with  a  large  amount  of
consumption  by  imposing  a  strong  curvature  on  the  utility  function,  while
simultaneously  allowing  for  a  sufficiently  high  level  of  output  after  the
stock  has  been  depleted,  so  that  with  low  stocks  the  value  of  defection
can  be  maintained  above  that  of  cooperation
When cooperation  cannot  be  immediately  enforced  as  an  equilibrium
from  the  initial  stock  by  using  some  appropriate  trigger  strategy,  the
above  discussion  raises  the  issue  of  finding  strategies  that  constitute  a
second  best  equilibrium. Characterizing  such  strategies  remains  an  open
problem
4.  Some  Final  Remarks
-24-We  have  shown  in  section  2  that  for  the  siaple  dynamic  programming
problem  that  arises  in  growth  theory,  setting  appropriate  elaaticities  of
the  utility  and  production  functions  equal  to  each  other  results  in
savings  policies  that  are  independent  of  capital  stocks. In  terms  of
Figure  1  however,  not  only  points  on  the  diagonal  but  also  those  on  the
vertical  axis  results  in  such  policies,  although  for  a  given  utility
function  the  policies  will  be  different.  First  consider  the  CES
production  function  (akl-C+(1-a>11-C)1/(1-C)  where  1  denotes  the  fixed
quantity  of  labor. For  1 - 0,  the  function  becomes  linear  and  is  given  by
.11 (1-.  ) k For  purposes  of  comparison  we  specify  a  linear  production
function  bk  +  (l-b)l,  where  b  -  .1/(1-c) We set  the  utility  function
As  is  already  known,  the  consumption  policy  for  the  linear (cl-C)/(l-f).
technology  can  be  computed  as  c  -  ~(y-l),  where  ~  -  1-(,a)l'8 For  the
CES production  function,  consumption  is  given  by  c  -  ~y,  again  with  ~  -  1-
(,8a) l/e Therefore  the  two  consumption  functions  only  differ  by  the
amount  ~l;  consumption  is  always  higher  with  the  CES production  function.
Therefore  we  can  conjecture  that,  in  terms  of  Figure  1,  moving  from  the
diagonal  towards  the  vertical  axis  where  technology  is  linear  tends  to
increase  the  propensity  to  save  out  of  income. The  problem  of  obtaining
exact  solutions  for  parameters  not  on  the  diagonal  or  on  the  axes  remains
open
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